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JOrgen Habermas's lifelong work has focused on the problem of curtailed communication. In the best tradition of critical theory, he has set
out to explicate the conditions that would need to be met to assure that
persons could come together freely to negotiate about and decide upon
the conditions of their existence collectively. Ideally, only the weight of
the better argument would rule the day. If such were the case, presumably the oppressive social structures of tradition, power, status, sexism,
racism , political influence, etc. that distort free communication could
be eliminated, thereby contributing to the emancipatory project of
critical theory. But many are dissatisfied with Habermas's "linguistic
turn," as Habermas's emphasis on the transcendental grounds of reason
appears overly abstract and rar removed rrom praxis or the promise or
practical application. In the book under review, Habermas takes up a
particularly troublesome practical domain for his theory: law.

Habermas argues that a "colonization of the lifeworld" occurs in modernity as impersonal media, money, and power infiltrate the lifeworld
and distort the communicative practices of persons in their everyday
face-to-face interactions. Functional integration, guided primarily by
instrumental and technical rationality of the administrative realm, is a
fundamental but problematic reality in modern societies as specialized
structures arise to manage increasing societal complexity (i.e., via
structural differentiation). In this way, Habermas's concern with the
"pathologies of modernity" carries on the critical tradition of the substantive social inquiries initiated by Marx, Weber, and even Durkheim.
Up through his Communicative Action period, Habermas's view of the
role of law was ambivalent at best. Habermas conceded that across
Western society, common and civil law had functioned as tools of
emancipation as the principle of democratic self-government arose to
combat earlier autocratic and monarchical forms of government. But
after this initial emancipatory thrust, whereby common law and civil
democracy came together to ensure rights for all citizens, Habermas
noted that law attains greater and greater prominence in modern
society primarily out of the need to establish some objective way of
adjudicating conflict between members of an increasingly disparate
citizenry. Law in effect becomes a "micro-manager" of people's everyday lives, and this formalization or textualization of everyday life
replaces the social solidarity of the lifeworld that formerly was forged
tacitly through uncodified norms of communicative acts and reason.
Habermas was especially concerned with the social-welfare state, because here we witness the creation of new and greater pressures toward
systems incursions into the lifeworld. For example, because a greater
range of "rights" are identified (on the basis of race, gender, sexual
orientation, age, disability, etc.), legal enforcement of these rights encroach further into the lifeworld, thereby individualizing legal claims.
Additionally, social-welfare provisions are implemented and statutes
are enforced bureaucratically through impersonal central organizations.
Finally, social-welfare claims are settled under the auspices of civil law,
with monetary compensation going to aggrieved parties (i.e., the consumerist re-definition of civil life). (These points are an adumbration
of a lengthier discussion found in Mathieu Deflem, "Introduction: Law
in Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action," Philosophy and
Social Criticism 20 (1994), 1-20.)

In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas overcomes his earlier ambivalent view of law by describing it as a social institution that arises out
of the common will of a people who, before establishing themselves as
legal consociates, are already a communication community held together by a linguistic bond. The linguistic bond is forged through
communicative actions wherein interactants take yes/no positions on
a range of issues involving validity claims of normative rightness, subjective truthfulness, and objective (or propositional) truth. In other
words, law is, at the systems or administrative level (through procedural
deliberation and decisionmaking arrived at impartially), the instantiation of the primordial condition of lifeworld actors who come together freely to regulate the conditions of their common life via the
negotiation and establishment of informal norms and values (i.e., culture) (pp. 304-308).
By assimilating law to his theory of communicative action in this way,
Habermas is able also to show how law is both a "social fact" that
draws upon the state's monopoly on power to compel citizens to align
their conduct to the prescriptions of the law ("facticity"), and a selfreferential system that, because of its "facticity" in the eyes of the
citizenry, can evoke respect for the law beyond sheer compliance ("validity"). Habermas argues that guarantees of law, namely certainty and
legitimacy, are simultaneously redeemed at the level of judicial decisionmaking, which at the systems level is analogous to the communicative
rationality of "mere" citizens rationally setting standards for the conditions of their existence at the lifeworld level (pp.197-203).
This move is controversial for a theorist coming out of the criticaltheory tradition, because Habermas seems to embrace normative theories of democracy that suggest values, and hence laws, are created out
of a consensus of citizens coming together to decide their fate collectively through representation. By contrast, critical theories of democracy hold that values are created primarily by elites who, wielding
enormous social and political power through ideological hegemony,
control the substance of public deliberation and, hence, are able to
pass into legislation laws that reflect and defend their own interests at
the expense of the relatively powerless masses (pp. 315-387).
Habermas attempts to walk a tightrope between these two extremes by
creating a proceduralist theory of democracy that "invests the democratic process with normative connotations stronger than those found
in the liberal model but weaker than those found in the republican

model" (p.298). In other words, Habermas argues that the ultimate
grounds of democracy must be founded not on the peculiar form that
deliberations in the public sphere take, but on the unthematized institutionalization of procedures and conditions of communication that
ultimately leads to thematized issues of democratic opinion- and willformation.
This is an extremely abstract and complex argument that appears
indefensible on the surface, and there is simply not enough space here
to justify or clarify fully Habermas's position. In effect, Habermas
wants to analyze the implementation of democratic procedures in
modern societies without lapsing into the reifying tendencies of earlier
theories that tend to view the creation and implementation of such
procedures as emanating from above rather than through the concerted
activities of real, flesh-and-blood human beings. As Bobbio states, "As
soon as we conceive intentional social relations as communicatively
mediated in the sense proposed, we are no longer dealing with disembodied, omniscient beings who exist beyond the empirical realm and
are capable of context-free action, so to speak" (p. 324).
Actors are socialized into concrete forms of life, but they are not totally
at the mercy of their lifeworld. Habermas's proceduralist view of democracy is derived from a discourse theory whose guiding principle
states that "Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly
affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse"
(p. 107). Within the contexts of their everyday lifeworId, actors take
yes/no positions on various claims pertaining to propositional truth,
normative rightness, and subjective truthfulness. The ability to say no
in any of these instances marks the freedom that comes through persuasion rather than coercion. Although no complex society could ever
fully implement this model of purely communicative social relations,
Habermas argues that there is an underside to the realities of inequality
and differential power that, although hidden from the participants
themselves, nevertheless contains the presuppositions of communicative
action and the tacit injunction of the discourse principle. Viewed in this
light, "law as such already incorporates those features from which the
model of 'pure' sociation abstracts" (p. 326).
By insisting ultimately on the ontological priority of the discourse principle, Habermas attempts to shatter once and for all the philosophy of
consciousness program. The philosophy of consciousness, Habermas
asserts, leads one either "to ascribe the citizens' practice of self-deter-

mination to a macrosocia1 subject or to refer the anonymous rule of
law to competing individual subjects" (p. 29). Discourse theory instead
"reckons with the higher-level intersubjectivity of processes of reaching
understanding that take place through democratic procedures or in the
communicative network of public spheres"(ibid.).
Habermas envisions relatively subjectless communications that form
arenas at both lifeworld and system levels in which rational opinionand will-formation can take place. This idea owes much to Parsons's
conceptualization of the generalized media of interchange - such as
money and power - that circulate throughout complex societies. Contra
Foucault, Mills, and other critical theorists, Habermas does not view
social life as a zero-sum game, but rather as a tableau of inflationary
and deflationary trends that range from oppressive totalitarianism at
one extreme to relatively free and open civil democracy at the other.
Habermas's entire argument is summed up in the following passage:
"Once one gives up the philosophy of the subject, one needs neither to
concentrate sovereignty concretely in the people nor to banish it in
anonymous constitutional structures and powers. The 'self' of the selforganizing legal community disappears in the subjectless forms of
communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion- and willformation in such a way that their fallible results enjoy the presumption
of being reasonable" (p. 301).
The most important thing to note about Habermas's program is that
his reliance (some would say over-reliance) on the force of rationality
as realized through talk, and as institutionalized in societal and political
communities, is constituted as Habermas's own self-conscious attempt
to capture the essence of such procedures and practices in his own
theory. In effect, Habermas is attempting to thematize much about
law and democracy that heretofore has gone unthematized. The important role of rationality and the discourse principle in Habermas's theory
could be construed as evidence that such procedures and practices are
indeed operating in the "real" world. At least this is Habermas's hope.
One problem, however, with Habermas's new sympathetic reading of
welfare-state law is that he appears to discard his earlier emphasis on the
importance of maintaining distinctions among various forms of rationality. These distinctions are, as we have seen, the unique forms of rationality paralleling the validity claims associated with issues of aesthetics
(subjective truthfulness), moral-practical concerns (normative rightness), and technical-instrumental actions (propositional truth). Haber-

mas seems to sidestep the fact that the basis of law as a design of
human action is overwhelmingly grounded in the idea of instrumental
or technical reason, insofar as law is narrowly circumscribed by evidentiary procedure and is limited to adjudicating conflict on a case-by-case
basis. Case law sets up precedents for the basic conception that any
legal norm can be created or changed by a procedurally correct enactment. This is certainly true, as Habermas appropriates this directly from
Weber's idea of the rational-legal domination by law in modern society.
But law is not a theory of society, and does not pretend to contain
indicators or dimensions of knowledge or practice that are isomorphic
with the empirical social world. There are huge gaps in law's understanding of the ontology of social action and social life. For example,
the limited rationality of law (instrumental rationality) means that the
"reasonable person" standard is seriously limited because it is assimilated to technical or instrumental rationality, as is the "reasonable
woman" standard that has recently become prominent in sexual harassment litigation and law.
If Habermas's reading of law is correct, and if the discourse principle
represents a sound basis for understanding the processes of law and
democratic opinion- and will-formation, then the ongoing textualization of social life may be viewed unproblematically and simply as a
logical derivative of the internal assumptions of democracy itself. If
indeed all law abiding citizens are equal under the law, and if indeed all
citizens should be able to participate broadly in society vis-a-vis the
rights that inhere to all as ratified members of the constitutional state,
then law should specify clearly and concretely the possible dimensions
across which citizens' rights can be assured. This leads to an inexorable
process within modern welfare states whereby persons' status sets - the
sum total of positions we hold in society - are formally connected to the
protections of the substantive law appropriate to that particular institutional sphere (family, economy, religion, polity, education).
An application: Sexual harassment
Consider the example of sexual harassment, or hate speech law. Today
across business, government, and education, the assumption is made
that because of the "alarming" rate of incidents of harassment - usually
verbal - formal guidelines must be enacted to control or sanction those
actions or utterances found to be offensive, inappropriate, derogatory,

inflammatory, or otherwise damaging. What should be realized, however, is that codifying rules of behavior presupposes that the heretofore
tacit, un articulated rules of conduct have somehow fallen into disrepair, and are no longer efficient mechanisms of social control.
Here, there is an explicit move away from the Enlightenment ethos that
posits a dualism of mind and body. It is plain that those attempting to
codify guidelines meant to control certain so-called offensive utterances
must also attempt to sell the notion that words can indeed hurt as much
as sticks and stones. Such a rhetorical ploy - in this case, the attempt to
equate mental with physical harm - is essential for the livelihood and
continuing legitimacy of any text. The pressures toward the continuing
textualization of life - such as codifying guidelines, procedural norms,
or truths regarding offensive talk - is symptomatic of broader processes
of institutionalization, an area Habermas seems less interested in, but
that nevertheless has an impact on his theory of democracy.
In reality, much of social life involves the battle over knowledge claims
(as played out through the implicit validity claims underlying all speech,
as Habermas rightly points out). Although we all share to some degree
a common culture, we see great differentiation at the level of individual
personality. This gives us the flavor of multiple meaning, and social life
can thereby be seen as a plurality of actors negotiating the conditions
of their existence.
Institutions, on the other hand, are quasi-symbolic forms of understanding that, even in the face of multiple meaning and polysymbolic
interpretation, survive by ordering taken-for-granted knowledge of
the essential segments of human activity. Institutions legitimate and
reaffirm their existence by producing official texts; these texts provide a
monologic interpretation of a particular area of social life.
Unfortunately, the attempt to sanction through texts the institutional
position as the singular objective truth goes beyond merely providing
for a symbolic understanding of that area of social life. Texts work to
"freeze" the world of everyday activity into an official, sanctioned version of reality that is nothing more than a "textualization" of that
reality. This closes off further understanding of that reality to members
of the societal community.
In summary, institutional pressures drive the legitimation of knowledge claims. These knowledge claims must come in the form of "texts"

that, as tracts of monologic discourse, serve to anchor its officially
sanctioned version of reality in a secure, rational world of social facts.
With this in mind, how did the texts containing recent legal decisions
pertaining to sexual harassment. and especially the "reasonable woman"
standard, come about, and is this explanation consistent with Habermas's new sympathetic reading of welfare-state law?
Very briefly, in a landmark 1991 case, the 9th U.S. Circuit Court in
California ruled that sexual harassment law covers any remark or
behavior that a "reasonable woman" would find to be a problem. The
court also acknowledged that a woman's perception might differ from
a man's (see Deborah L. Siegel, Sexual Harassment: Research and
Resources, New York: National Council for Research on Women,
1992). Judge Robert Beezer noted that "conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may offend women," and that because women
are more likely to be the victims of a sexual assault, they have "a
stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior." This ruling
assumes, however, that there is a continuum that runs from the innocent gesture to the brutish assault, all of which can be covered under
the rubric of sexual harassment law, be it of the quid pro quo or "hostile
environment" form. From some social-science perspectives, and especially from the perspective of Habermas's system/lifeworld distinction
and the refinement of forms of rationality and validity claims operating
in various social spheres, this is patently ridiculous. The attempt to
capture this particular slice of social reality through formalization reflects not only law's tendency toward arbitrariness, but also the huge
holes that exist in law's ability to make sense of the world, guided as it
is by narrow understandings of the world as manifested in its employment of technical or instrumental rationality. In this sense, law may be
understood as a system imperative intruding upon lifeworld activity,
and the ongoing textualization of social life indeed may be considered
an element in the colonization of the lifeworld.
A leading pathology of modernity, then, is the gradual infiltration of
law into ever greater expanses of lifeworld activity. As informal understandings of life give way to formal rules codified in law, the lifeworld
becomes increasingly impoverished. As I see it, Habermas went too far
in attempting to show that, no matter how bad things seem to be
getting, citizens living in post-conventional societies (i.e., in constitutional democracies) still have the power to create conditions for their
existence that all could agree upon form a valid and just form oflife (as
per the discourse principle). But Habermas need not point to law as

functioning only in a positive or beneficial direction. The great promise
of Habermas's theory of communicative action is, and has been, to
identify the structures and processes operating within democratic societies that might pose a threat to the democratic principles of justice
and fairness for all.
Even with what I perceive as his misplaced and over-vigorous defense
of welfare-state law, Habermas's linguistic account of solidarity, namely
the bonds that hold members of a democratically self-regulated lifeworld together through a rationally motivated agreement to reach
understanding, is still the best resource for understanding both the
blessings and ills of modernity.
Kansas Newman College
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